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The Louisiana Legislature's Attempt to Reduce Auto
Insurance Rates with No Pay, No Play: The Answer,
A Step in the Right Direction, or Completely Useless?
I. INTRODUCTION
Louisiana is one of forty-seven states in the nation plus the
District of Columbia (D.C.) to require some form of auto insurance
coverage.' This requirement is driven by each state's need to
promote stability and protect its citizens when they suffer losses in an
auto accident.2 Louisiana, like most states, reuires each driver to
maintain minimum third party liability coverage. The Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Laws require a minimum Bodily Injury (BI)
coverage of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident and
Property Damage (PD) coverage of $10,000 per accident.4
Unfortunately, this coverage costs money and affects an
overwhelming percentage of Louisiana citizens. As such, it is one of
the only laws by which the state imposes an expense on its citizens.
Some think this imposition is unfair. Others believe it is a necessary
evil and completely justified. Regardless, it is the law that must be
observed and a cost for all to bear.
Louisiana has a history of battling high auto insurance rates.
Compulsory auto liability insurance legislation intensifies the effect of
this problem; both the rich and poor are required to purchase car
insurance. As part of this battle, the State has kept a close watch on
insurance rates. Until recently, any rate change required prior
approval by vote of the Louisiana Insurance Rating Commission
(LIRC) and, even now, the filings are reviewed for actuarial
soundness and changes in excess of ten percent reach the LIRC's
agenda.5 The public is also very aware of auto insurance rates; the
renewal notice informing a policyholder that their premium has
Copyright 2006, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW.
1. Insurance Information Institute, The I.I.I. Insurance Fact Book 2005 at
p. 50-53 (2005).
2. See Williams v. US Agencies Cas. Ins. Co., Inc., 2000-1693 (La.
2/21/01), 779 So. 2d 729.
3. La. R.S. 32:861 (2002).
4. La. R.S. 32:900B(2) (2002 & Supp. 2005).
5. La. R.S. 22:1406 (2004).
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increased rarely goes unnoticed. Furthermore, the major newspapers
consistently report rate changes, usually in the upward direction, of
the state's top insurance writers.
To do its part to address rising insurance rates, the legislature
passed the Omnibus Premium Reduction Act of 1997, mandating a
ten percent rate decrease for auto liability coverage. 6 This decrease
was to be offset by a recovery limitation for uninsured motorists,
known as No Pay, No Play. Since its highly publicized passage, the
No Pay, No Play legislation has received little attention.
Section II of this paper sets forth the backdrop the legislature was
working against by surveying the plight of Louisiana auto insurance
consumers. Next, section III analyzes the statute from beginning to
end. It reviews the development of No Pay, No Play, its enactment,
and the courts' and legislature's subsequent actions. Section IV
attempts to quantify the statute's effects in comparison to its purpose
for an overall evaluation of the legislation. Finally, section V of this
paper presents several proposals for future legislative action to keep
the auto insurance reform ball rolling.
1I. DIAGNOSIS OF SKYROCKETING RATES AND TREATMENT WITH No
PAY, No PLAY
A. Breaking the Bank: The Louisiana Insurance Epidemic
Louisiana auto insurance rates have consistently been among the
highest in the United States. In 1997,7 Louisiana ranked eighth in the
nation for estimated average expenditure per vehicle for private
passenger auto insurance.8 The only states higher were New Jersey,
D.C., New York, Hawaii, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Nevada.
9
Louisiana's average expenditure of $841.07 per year was nineteen
percent higher than the national average and exceeded neighboring
6. La. R.S. 32:866 note (Legislative Intent, 1997 La. Acts No. 1476 sec. 5)
(2002 & Supp. 2005).
7. This was the year in which the legislature was acting to pass reform.





states Texas, Arkansas, and Mississippi by thirteen percent, forty-
eight percent, and twenty-nine percent respectively.'
0
More troubling than its rank by auto insurance rates, Louisiana
tops the chart for yet another negative statistic. Louisiana's "Pain
Index" is the highest in the country." The "Pain Index" refers to the
ratio of average auto insurance expenditure to median household
income for a family of four in a given state.' 2 Louisiana families
spend an average of 1.64% of their income on auto insurance. 13 This
percentage is just slightly higher than second ranked D.C., which has
the highest auto rates in the country. 14  Louisiana drivers are
definitely feeling the pain.
B. The Louisiana Legislature's Prescription: No Pay, No Play
With most of their constituents facing the auto insurance rate
problem, Louisiana legislators naturally sought influence on the rates
through legal measures. Without taking the radical approach of
actually setting the rates companies could charge, the multitude of
factors that affect insurance rates could be targeted with rate decrease
prompting legislation.
Perhaps inadvertently, the multitude of tort reform passed in
199615 had an impact on auto insurance rates. An independent study
commissioned by the LIRC determined that the changes in
comparative fault recovery and the partial elimination of the strict
liability doctrine would reduce losses for private passenger auto
policies, namely BI coverage. 16 Beginning in September of 1996, the
LIRC required companies to factor the calculated 6.2% savings on
10. Id. at 2.4-2.5.
11. PPA Affordability "Pain Index", Auto Insurance Report, August 18,
2003 at 1 (on file with author).
12. See PPA Affordability, supra note 11.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. The revisions evaluated were: the introduction of comparative fault; the
elimination of exemplary damages for hazardous materials; the narrowing of the
scope of strict liability; and the cap on damages against the state.
16. Wayne D. Holdredge, Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, Esimated Loss
Reduction Due to 1996 Tort Reforms, 12-16 (La. Insurance Rating Comm'n
Aug 19, 1996), available at http://www.ldi.state.la.us/consumers/LIRC/
LIRCbulletins/bulletin96-05.pdf (last visited 12/09/2005).
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losses for BI coverage into their rate filings. 17 Losses are just one of
many components of an insurer's rates, so even though consumers
likely realized a premium savings on this one coverage, the amount
was probably slight. This tort reform, though marginally helpful, did
not provide much relief from Louisiana's extreme auto insurance
burden.
1. Legislative History and Development of No Pay, No Play
In 1996, Governor Foster, having always been a proponent of
auto insurance reform, was eager to implement measures specifically
designed to reduce rates. He appointed the Louisiana Task Force for
Reduction of Automobile Insurance Rates (Task Force) with the
express purpose of generating a feasible and promising proposal for
reducing auto insurance rates in Louisiana. The Task Force, through
its subcommittees, considered many options ranging from the
reasonable to the ridiculous. A few of the rejected proposals were to:
ban radar detectors; raise the minimum driving age to sixteen;
prohibit happy hour sales; repeal the direct action statute; and move to
a no-fault system of auto insurance.
18
The Task Force next sought help from an Actuarial Subcommittee
composed of a Department of Insurance (DOI) actuary and other
insurance industry experts. They directed this subcommittee to
evaluate the impact of as many proposals within their time and
resource constraints and identify the five proposals that would result
in the highest insurance savings. The subcommittee closely evaluated
ten proposals and sorted the rest into groups based on their expected
savings potential. The top five proposals and their estimated savings
on a basic package policy were as follows:
20
17. Louisiana Insurance Rating Commission Bull. and Directive LIRC 96-
05 (1996), available at http://www.ldi.state.la.us/consumers/LIRC/LIRC-
bulletins/bulletin96-05.pdf (last visited 12/09/2005).
18. La. Task Force for Reduction of Auto. Ins. Rates, Report of the
Actuarial Subcommittee (Mar. 5, 1997) (on file with author). See discussion on
no-fault auto insurance infra Part IV.B. 1.
19. A basic package policy was defined as an annual policy with 10/20/10
BI/PD limits and 10/20 uninsured motorist coverage.
20. Report of the Actuarial Subcommittee, supra note 18.
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Proposal: Percentage DollarSavings Savings
No-Fault2' 37% to 44% $138 to $164
GAP Coverage2 2  9.0% to 14.0% $34 to $52
UM Coverage for.
Economic Loss 23  8.0% to 9.0% $30 to $34
No Pay, No Play24  4.3% to 10.0% $16 to $37
Modified Comparative 5.0% to 5.8% 19 to $22
Fault25
The legislature implemented two of these proposals, UM
Coverage for Economic Loss and No Pay, No Play, as part of the
Omnibus Premium Reduction Act of 1997.26
The first and foremost purpose of the No Pay, No Play statute
was to lessen the burden of compulsory auto insurance; 27 upon the
statute's passage, the legislation required insurance companies to
implement rate reductions based on the projected savings. An
immediate rate reduction of ten percent on both the BI and PD
coverages was forced upon the insurance industry.28 Notably, this
21. See discussion on no-fault auto insurance infra Part IV.B.1.
22. Under this option uninsured motorist coverage would be gap coverage
instead of excess coverage, such that the UM limit of an insured would be the
maximum recovery under all policies, instead of an additional recovery.
23. UM-Economic Only coverage is uninsured motorist coverage that
would provide for only economic losses, and not non-economic losses such as
pain and suffering.
24. No Pay, No Play provisions are laws whereby an uninsured driver
would be prevented from collecting some portion of his losses.
25. This proposal would institute a threshold for fault of the other party
before the injured party recovers damages.
26. La. R.S. 32:866 note (Legislative Intent, 1997 La. Acts No. 1476, § 5)
(2002 & Supp. 2005).
27. La. R.S. 32:866 note (Legislative Intent, 1997 La. Acts No. 1476, §
5(A)) (2002 & Supp. 2005).
28. La. R.S. 32:866 note (Legislative Intent, 1997 La. Acts No. 1476, § 1)
(2002 & Supp. 2005).
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rate reduction was the maximum of the range of estimated
premium savings calculated by the Actuarial Subcommittee.
A secondary purpose of No Pay, No Play was to encourage
compliance with the Motor Vehicle Safety Res onsibility Laws,
thus reducing the uninsured motorist population. The statute was
intended to influence society's behavior by introducing yet another
penalty for being uninsured. Failure to maintain the requisite
security could already result in a vehicle's registration being
revoked, vehicle impoundment, fines, license suspension, and even
imprisonment in rare situations. 30  Similarly, No Play, No Play
represented the most recent attempt at reducing the uninsured
population.
The No Pay, No Play concept was nothing new in the realm of
auto insurance reform. At the time, a few other states had enacted
similar legislation. Since the enactment of Louisiana's statute,
however, others have followed. California, New Jersey, Michigan,
and Alaska all have employed the No Pay, No Play approach to
reducing insurance rates as well as lowering the uninsured
population. The laws in California, Michigan, and Alaska preclude
uninsured motorists involved in an accident from collecting any
non-economic losses such as pain and suffering, mental anguish,
and disfigurement.3 1 New Jersey's version of No Pay, No Play
states that motorists who do not carry the requisite coverage have
no cause of action for any damages. 3z Louisiana's version appears
more moderate, barring recovery for the first $10,000 in damages
for both the BI and PD coverages by uninsured drivers.
33
However, since most losses are within the $10,000 threshold,
Louisiana's law is nearly as harsh as New Jersey's No Pay, No
Play.
2. No Pay, No Play Clears the Constitutional Hurdle
Act 1476 of the Louisiana Legislature, known as the Omnibus
Premium Reduction Act of 1997, was a complex piece of
legislation affecting many areas relating to auto insurance rates. It
29. La. R.S. 32:866 note (Legislative Intent, 1997 La. Acts No. 1476, § 1)
(2002 & Supp. 2005). Estimates of Louisiana's uninsured population ranged
from thirteen percent to twenty-nine percent. Report of the Actuarial
Subcommittee, supra note 18, at 6.
30. La. R.S. 32:863-865 (2002 & Supp. 2005).
31. Cal. Civ. Code § 3333.4 (1997); Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.3135 (2002
& Supp. 2005); Alaska Stat. § 09.65.300 (2004).
32. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:6A-4.5 (2002 & Supp. 2005).
33. La. R.S. 32:866(A)(1) (2002 & Supp. 2005).
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amended several existing provisions while also implementing new
ones. The Act: 1) Revised judicial interest rates;34 2) Established
requirements for an insurer's notice of cancellation of an insurance
policy to the State;35 3) Required insurers to offer UM coverage for
economic losses only for a rate at a minimum of twenty percent
less than the traditional coverage; 36 4) Restricted recovery for
uninsured motorists involved in auto accidents (the No Pay, No
Play aspect); 37 and 5) Mandated a ten percent rate reduction on BI
and PD rates for all insurers doing business in Louisiana. 38 The
No Pay, No Play element eliminated recovery by uninsured
motorists of the first $10,000 of their bodily injury or property
damage losses when involved in an auto accident. 39  The few
exceptions to the recovery limitation were when the driver of the
other vehicle: 1) was driving while intoxicated,4 0 2) intentionally
caused the accident,4 1 3) fled the accident scene, or 4) was in
furtherance of committing a felony at the time of the accident.43
Passengers of an uninsured motor vehicle who were not
themselves the owner of that vehicle were also allowed to recover
the full amount of their damages. 44 The statute also provided for
the assessment of costs on uninsured drivers if they filed suit and
were awarded less than the $10,000 threshold for each coverage. 45
Of course, few pieces of controversial legislation are enacted
without withstanding constitutional review. With this foresight the
legislature provided for an immediate declaratory judgment on the
constitutionality of the statute,46 especially in light of the intense
opposition to the legislation. The Louisiana Supreme Court
34. La. R.S. 9:3500 (Supp. 2005).
35. La. R.S. 32:863.2 (2002).
36. La. R.S. 32:866 note (Legislative Intent, 1997 La. Acts No. 1476, §
5(B)) (2002 & Supp. 2005).
37. La. R.S. 32:866 (2002 & Supp. 2005).
38. La. R.S. 32:866 note (Legislative Intent, 1997 La. Acts No. 1476, §
5(A)) (2002 & Supp. 2005).
39. La. R.S. 32:866(A)(1) (2002 & Supp. 2005).
40. La. R.S. 32:866(A)(3)(a)(i) (2002 & Supp. 2005).
41. La. R.S. 32:866(A)(3)(a)(ii) (2002 & Supp. 2005).
42. La. R.S. 32:866(A)(3)(a)(iii) (2002 & Supp. 2005).
43. La. R.S. 32:866(A)(3)(a)(iv) (2002 & Supp. 2005).
44. La. R.S. 32:866(E) (2002 & Supp. 2005).
45. La. R.S. 32:866(C) (2002 & Supp. 2005).
46. La. R.S. 32:866 note (Legislative Intent, 1997 La. Acts No. 1476, § 6)
(2002 & Supp. 2005).
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conducted a constitutional review of the statute in Progressive
Security Insurance Company v. Foster.
4 7
The court rejected several constitutional challenges to the No
Pay, No Play statute asserted by an insurer and an insurance trade
organization. The plaintiffs argued that the limitation of recovery
for uninsured drivers constituted excessive, cruel, and unusual
punishment under the Louisiana Constitution. The court disagreed,
finding that the recovery limitation was not a punishment at all. It
reasoned that driving is a privilege with many conditions already
attached to it such as acquiring a license and taking driver's
education. The court characterized the recovery limitation as
another of such conditions of driving. The plaintiffs also argued
that the mandated rate reduction violated the Louisiana
Constitution because the legislature was exercising the rate-setting
power granted to the LIRC. The court dismissed this contention,
noting that the statute clearly provided for final approval by the
LIRC of the rate filings containing the required reductions. In
response to the plaintiffs' assertion of vagueness, the court settled
that the language "occasioned by" in the statute meant "suffered
by" as dictated by the context and purpose of the legislation. The
legislation's reasonable relation of the uninsured classification to a
legitimate state interest, reducing the uninsured population and
insurance rates, was sufficient to defeat the plaintiffs' equal
protection argument. The court easily dispensed with the
plaintiffs' due process claim by declaring that there was no
fundamental due process right to sue in tort and by saying that the
legislature was simply redefining the scope of the available causes
of action. Finally, the court ruled that the recovery limitation did
not deny uninsured motorists access to the courts. It merely placed
a limit on their legal remedies, which is authorized by the
constitution.
Having survived constitutional scrutiny, all provisions of the
Omnibus Premium Reduction Act took effect on May 8, 1998, the
date of the final and definitive judgment. The LIRC subsequently
declared May 8, 1998 to be "rate reduction day" with the statute
declaring that the No Pay, No Play provisions were to take effect
120 days later, on September 6, 1998.9
47. 97-2985 (La. 4/23/98), 711 So. 2d 675.
48. The plaintiffs asserted that uninsured motorists comprised an
"unpopular group," likening them to other suspect classifications defined as
race, alienage, and religion. Id. at 687 n. 16.





3. Predicting the Unpredictable: The Application of No Pay,
No Play in Louisiana Courts
Insurance companies hoped the courts would apply the No Pay,
No Play provisions liberally, while uninsured motorists and their
advocates desired more restrictive interpretations of the statute.
The case law applying the statute has fallen on both sides of the
line, to the delight and dismay of everyone.
a. Decisions Restricting No Pay, No Play
In several questionable situations the courts have held the No
Pay, No Play statute inapplicable, thus limiting its effect on losses.
In such cases, drivers were still permitted to recover the full
amount of their damages even though they were uninsured.
Courts have easily reached the conclusion that No Pay, No
Play does not appl to vehicles registered in another state. In
Atkinson v. Boyne 32 Martin v. Special Risk Insurance, Inc.,51 and
Gann v. Cucullu the courts held that uninsured Mississippi
drivers were not subject to the recovery restrictions since the clear
language of the statute provided for application to vehicles
registered in Louisiana. However, the issue is not completely
resolved. As the Gann court noted, the accidents in these cases all
occurred before Mississippi required compulsory auto insurance.
Additionally, the Louisiana Legislature amended Louisiana's
financial responsibility law to require residents of states which
have compulsory auto liability insurance laws to maintain such
coverage while driving in Louisiana, expressly subjecting those in
violation to No Pay, No Play sanctions.
5
Insurers have faced particular difficulty with respect to drivers
who are uninsured because their coverage was cancelled due to
non-payment of premium. The strict notification standards
insurers must follow have let a few technically uninsured motorists
circumvent the rule. Henderson v. Geico General Insurance Co.
54
involved a separated couple, where the husband who remained in
the matrimonial domicile claimed that he did not receive any
notice of cancellation. The wife was subsequently involved in an
accident and the insurance company tried to invoke the affirmative
defense of her being uninsured. The court held that there was
50. 178 F.Supp. 2d 670 (E.D. La. 2001).
51. 01-2931 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/7/02), 825 So. 2d 1235.
52. No. Civ.A.02-0607, 2002 WL 31496372 (E.D. La. 2002).
53. La. R.S. 32:861(E) (2002).
54. 36,696 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1/29/03), 837 So. 2d 736.
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insufficient evidence that the insurance company actually mailed a
notice of cancellation. The court had previously required all of the
following in order to establish a prima facie case of mailing:
computer generated records of mailing with witness verification
and authentication, certificates of mailing, and testimony that the
insurer had no records indicating that the notice was returned. This
requirement asks a lot of the insurer and makes it very difficult to
prove a valid notice of cancellation. The first circuit reached a
similar result in Williams v. Storms55 by following the case law
which has held that an insured's denial of receipt of notice of
cancellation is sufficient to defeat an insurer's motion for summary56judgment. As a result of these decisions, those who have had
their policies cancelled for non-payment of premium are much
more likely to collect the full amount of their damages.
Uninsured parked cars have also given the courts difficulty. In
Gibbs v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 5 7 the court
decided not to apply No Pay, No Play to a parked vehicle, stating
that the statute was intended to discourage operation of uninsured
vehicles. The legislature approved of this view, and amended the
statute to explicitly exclude uninsured legally parked vehicles from
its scope.58 The court in Rogers v. Commercial Union Insurance
Company59 held this amendment to be interpretive and applied it
retroactively. The court in Dallas v. Hales60 held the exact
opposite, refusing to apply the amendment retroactively and
limiting recovery. The Dallas court observed that even if it
applied the amendment retroactively, it still might not apply in the
case before it, since the driver had parked the uninsured vehicle on
the side of the highway due to mechanical problems. It raised
doubt as to whether the circumstances could result in the vehicle
being legally parked, as it had been in operation immediately prior.
The legislature solved this problem with another amendment,
which states that the recovery limitation does not apply if the
vehicle is not being operated at the time.6 1 In summary, owners of
uninsured vehicles not in operation can collect the full amount of
their damages.
55. 01-2820 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/8/02), 835 So. 2d 755.
56. The case law holds contrary to a statute which states that proof of
mailing shall be sufficient proof of notice. See La. R.S. 22:636.1(F) (2004 &
Supp. 2005).
57. 99-1242 (La. App. 4th Cir. 10/13/99), 746 So. 2d 685.
58. La. R.S. 32:866(H) (2002 & Supp. 2005).
59. 01-0443 (La. App. 3d Cir. 10/03/01), 796 So. 2d 862, 866.
60. 35,883 (La. App. 2d Cir. 05/08/02), 819 So. 2d 367, 373.
61. La. R.S. 32:866 (A) (3) (b) (2002 & Supp. 2005).
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b. The Expansion of No Pay, No Play
There have been several questionable situations where the
courts have applied the No Pay, No Play limitation, including a
decision by the Louisiana Supreme Court. These decisions have in
effect expanded the scope of the statute, thus reducing losses tied
to uninsured motorists. In these cases, the insurers have seen some
of the projected savings that the statute was designed to produce.
Courts have held that operators of uninsured vehicles, even if
not their own, are barred from collecting the first $10,000 of their
BI and PD recovery under No Pay, No Play. In Blue v. Donnie
62Baines Cartemps USA, the court ruled that an unlicensed driver
who knew that he was excluded from the policy insuring the car he
was driving was uninsured for purposes of the statute.
Surprisingly, the third circuit held in Jasper v. Progressive Ins.
Co. . that even an operator of a borrowed vehicle who did not
know it was uninsured still was subject to the reduced recovery.
The court focused on the language of the statute which refers to an
operator of a motor vehicle, which clearly included borrowers. 64 It
reasoned that by using "operator" in addition to "owner," the
statute was meant to encourage borrowers to ascertain that the
vehicle they are driving is insured.65 Even though this is the only
case on the subject, under the court's reasoning, the possibility
exists that anyone driving an uninsured vehicle may not be entitled
to full recovery because of the No Pay, No Play statute.
Another questionable scenario is the case of the injured
passenger who was in an uninsured vehicle registered to her
spouse. The court in Lewis v. Miller66 held that the term "owner"
as used in the No Pay, No Play statute encompassed a spouse of
the registered owner. Reasoning that since the passenger-wife had
legal custody of the vehicle by virtue of community property law,
it determined that she also had the obligation to maintain liability
insurance. 67 This decision indicates that no matter which spouse's
name is on the bill of sale, both are responsible for maintaining
insurance on the vehicle and both are limited on their recovery
under No Pay, No Play if uninsured.
62. 38,279 (La. App. 2d Cir. 03/03/04), 868 So. 2d 246, 248.
63. 99-1479 (La. App. 3d Cir. 02/09/00), 758 So. 2d 848, 851.
64. Id. at 850.
65. Id. at 851.




Until Bryant v. United Serv. 's Auto. Ass'n 68 came down from
the Louisiana Supreme Court, the circuits were split on whether
owners could recover the full amount of their property damage
when a driver excluded by their insurance policy was operating the
vehicle. In the court's view, the policies underlying the No Pay,
No Play statute conflicted with those underlying the legislature's
allowance of the so called "named driver exclusions." In situations
where the named insured gave permission for the excluded driver
to operate the vehicle, the court resolved in favor of No Pay, No
Play. The court believed that recovery should be barred since the
named insured "thwarted the law" by excluding a driver to reduce
their premium, but then allowing that driver to operate their
vehicle. The court saw the application of No Pay, No Play as a
way to discourage. owners from allowing an excluded driver to
operate their cars. Conversely, in cases when the owner did not
give permission to the excluded driver, the court held that recovery
should not be reduced. The court equated this scenario to a thief
getting into an accident with the stolen vehicle and ruled that it
would be absurd to apply No Pay, No Play in such a situation.
After the courts and the legislature have whittled away at the
scope of the recovery limitation, the statute does not seem to apply
to very many situations. It applies to an owner of an uninsured
vehicle or their spouse when they are in their own vehicle, but only
while it is in operation. Drivers of uninsured vehicles are subject
to the reduced recovery provisions in all instances. Owners who
permit their vehicles to be operated by drivers excluded by their
insurance policies may not collect for their property damage. The
narrow scope of No Pay, No Play's application ensures not only
that the ten percent rate reduction will not be justified in the long
run, but also that the statute will not foster future rate relief.
mH. SEVEN YEARS LATER: A LOOK AT THE EFFECTS OF No PAY,
No PLAY
The legislators can say they were successful. "Premium
Reduction Day" marked an achievement of the Task Force's goal
as auto insurance rates were reduced ten percent for BI and PD
coverages. However, implementing the No Pay, No Play recovery
limitation with its corresponding rate decrease only resulted in a
one time rate change. This one time rate decrease was taken up
front to reflect the expected future savings of the No Pay, No Play
statute. Provided the estimates by the Actuarial Subcommittee
68. 03-3491 (La. 09/09/04), 881 So. 2d 1214.
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prove accurate, the new legislation alone will not result in any
more rate decreases. Further, the ten percent mandated rate
reduction was ambitious and probably unreasonably optimistic.
By taking the high end of the range submitted by the Actuarial
Subcommittee, the legislature left insurers vulnerable to the
success or failure of the recovery limitation scheme. Since poor
experience lends itself to upward rate adjustments, the future was
already dim.
While insurers may or may not have been experiencing the
effects of the No Pay, No Play statute,6 9 numerous other factors
continued to affect the insurance industry. Losses paid to
uninsured motorists were just one of the forces responsible for the
previous upward trend in auto rates. Skyrocketing medical costs,
rising defense costs, and bad loss experience in general all
continue to plague insurers. Particularly damaging is the effect
that lawsuit awareness has had on the frequency and severity of
claims.
Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to
compromise whenever you can. Point out to them how the
nominal winner is often a real loser-in fees, expenses, and
waste of time.7"
Litigiousness is an increasing concern not unique to the
insurance industry. Auto accidents are increasingly being viewed
less as catastrophes and more as windfalls, and people are
becoming less likely to let a minor "fender bender" slide. This is
especially true in an age where we have so-called "personal injury
clinics" taking referrals from attorneys who are consulted before a
claim is even filed, where chiropractors have billboards advertising
that they extend credit, and where anyone and everyone is referred
to a neurologist. The "hit me, I need the money" mentality runs
rampant in our society.71  With Orleans Parish having been
identified as a "judicial hellhole" 72 by the American Tort Reform
Association, Louisiana clearly faces the same problems of
69. The precise impact of No Pay, No Play on insurers is difficult to
ascertain statistically and is subject to speculation. The statute might have been
successful at encouraging more people to buy insurance. Insurers may not even
see claims by uninsureds who know they cannot recover.
70. Abraham Lincoln, Notes for Law Lecture (July 1, 1850), in 2 Complete
Works of Abraham Lincoln 140, 142 (J. Nicolay & J. Hay eds. 1894).
71. Marjorie M. Berte, Hit Me-I Need the Money! The Politics of Auto
Insurance Reform (ICS Press 1991).
72. Am. Tort Reform Ass'n, Bringing Justice to Judicial Hellholes 26
(2004), available at http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/2004/hellholes2004.
pdf. This characterization was based on sympathy to plaintiffs. Id. at 8-9.
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litigiousness that infect the nation. 73 Additionally, one third of
Americans think that there is nothing wrong with inflating
insurance claims. 74 Unfortunately, these people do not realize that
they are hurting more than the insurance company who is paying
their claim. They are ultimately hurting themselves and all other
auto insurance consumers by driving up their premiums.
Yielding to these additional factors would no doubt undermine
the achievement of the No Pay, No Play statute. Recognizing this
dilemma, the LIRC attempted to keep rates at their newly lowered
level for several months. The LIRC took a stand and consistently
denied rate increases for private passenger auto coverage. The
purpose of holding rates constant might have been to let the effects
of the recovery limitation play out before reacting to any perceived
rate deficiencies. The LIRC also might have desired to give at
least the appearance of rate relief to Louisiana consumers.
Eventually the factors not addressed by the Omnibus Premium
Reduction Act prevailed and insurance rates resumed their upward
trend. By 2003, Louisiana's average premium had increased to
$1,013.93, a twenty percent increase since 1997, moving the state
up to a sixth rank in the nation for auto insurance rates.75
IV. PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE
Though No Pay, No Play was somewhat successful in reducing
the auto insurance burden in the short term, it was not a law that
could have a continuing beneficial effect on rates into the future.
In essence, the statute, along with its mandated rate reduction,
treated the symptoms instead of the disease. 76  For any auto
insurance reform to have the desired long term benefits, it must
target the heart of the problem. The two major components to the
rates charged by an insurance company are losses and expenses.
The loss component is a function of frequency and severity. 7 Any
73. Tort filings in civil cases rose twenty percent in 2001. Insurance
Information Institute.
74. AICPU/IIA [American Institute for Chartered Property Casualty
Underwriters and the Insurance Institute of America], Insurance Research
Council, One in Three Americans Say It's Acceptable to Inflate Insurance
Claims, But Public Acceptance of Insurance Fraud is Declining (2003),
http://www.ircweb.org/news/200307242.htm.
75. Ins. Info. Inst., Auto Insurance Facts and Statistics (2005),
http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/auto/.
76. Berte, supra note 71, at 68-70.
77. Claim severity represents the average amount of paid claims, as
determined by taking the total dollar amount the insurer paid out for losses and
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reform measure expected to have a lasting effect must address one
of these elements.
A. Controlling Insurance Expenses
Perhaps the most difficult component to address through
legislation is insurer expenses. True, lower operating costs mean
that a profit can still be realized with less premium and lower rates,
but these operating costs are in the hands of the insurance
companies. Expense ratios78 vary significantly from company to
company and depend on such factors as size and age of the entity.
Mandating a maximum expense ratio that insurers could factor into
their rates would be next to impossible. This requirement would
discriminate against smaller and younger companies and would
discourage such insurers from doing business in Louisiana.
Excluding a portion of the market in such a manner would hurt
Louisiana consumers, since fewer choices mean less competition
and less incentive for insurers to keep rates down. The cost of
losing the companies squeezed from the market likely outweighs
any savings from imposing a maximum expense ratio. Insurer
self-help, whereby insurers take it upon themselves to cut costs, is
the only realistic means of controlling the expense component of
insurance rates.
B. Insurance Claims Costs
1. Proposals Addressing Severity
Auto insurance reform legislation commonly addresses claim
severity. Within this area, laws can be directed at medical costs,
the type of damages recoverable by accident victims, and the
amount of such damages. No-fault insurance is a common
proposal that focuses on the means of recovery as well as what
types of damages are recoverable from which sources. Limitations
on the cost of medical services provided to accident victims aim to
reduce the dollar amount of losses paid by insurers.
dividing by the number of claims paid (frequency). Reduction of either figure
results in lower losses by the insurer and, consequently, lower rates.




No-fault insurance was the proposal that the Actuarial
Subcommittee estimated would have the greatest impact on rates.
79
A no-fault system would completely change the way insurance is
bought, how claims are made, and what damages can be
recovered.8 ° One of the most significant changes is that drivers
would buy first party insurance coverage instead of third party
liability coverage. Personal injury protection (PIP) would cover
the purchaser of the policy for his medical expenses, lost wages,
and related services resulting from an auto accident regardless of
fault. A property damage package would provide compensation
for the purchaser's vehicle(s). The second biggest change is the
way in which tort claims are brought against a negligent party.
Parties could only bring tort claims for uncompensated economic
losses 8 1 or non-economic losses for certain severe injuries. 82
Medical costs also factor into claim severity and directly affect
insurance rates in two ways. The first and most obvious way is on
the amount insurers pay for the treatment of accident victims'
injuries. Second, and more indirectly, medical costs affect the total
claim amount by driving up compensation for non-economic
losses. It is no secret that non-economic losses such as pain and
suffering are often calculated as a function of medical costs. As a
result, rising medical costs lead to increased non-economic damage
awards.
It may seem difficult to control the effect of medical costs on
insurance rates, since doctors' charges and other health care related
costs are not regulated. Progressive legislation enacted in
Pennsylvania, however, demonstrates that the insurance industr,
does not have to be at the mercy of medical professionals.
Pennsylvania's statute provides for medical costs to be capped at
79. The estimated savings was thirty-seven percent to forty-four percent on
a basic package policy. Report of the Actuarial Subcommittee, supra note 18, at
3.
80. Various forms of no-fault insurance exist, but the one outlined is the
form evaluated by the Actuarial Subcommittee.
81. Uncompensated economic losses are those not paid by a party's PIP
coverage.
82. Non-economic damages could be recovered in tort for death, permanent
brain injury, quadriplegia and paraplegia, dismemberment, total loss of vision in
one or both eyes, total loss of hearing in one or both ears, loss of or serious
permanent injury to an internal organ, significant and permanent disfigurement
of scarification, or fracture of one or more of the following weight bearing
bones: the pelvis, fibula, tibia, or femur. Report of the Actuarial Subcommitee,
supra note 18, app. at 18.
83. 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1797 (1996).
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110% of the Medicare fee schedule and requires all injured
persons ' 84 medical bills to be reviewed by a disinterested peer
review organization. 85  The Louisiana Task Force actually
considered this measure, recognizing its success at reducing
medical payments. Pennsylvania Insurance Department reports
indicated that auto insurance companies representing fifty percent
of the market share in the state saved an average of thirty-nine
percent in payments to medical providers. 86 Such a large reduction
in medical costs coupled with probable reduced non-economic
damage awards should translate into lower insurance rates.
2. Proposals Addressing Frequency
Claim frequency, the second component of the loss equation,
has become a problem in recent years. While accident rates have
decreased in the last two decades, auto injury claim frequency has
been on the rise. 87 A portion of the claims made in Louisiana are
attributable to guest passengers making negligence claims against
the driver of the vehicle in which they are riding. Not satisfied
with the medical payments coverage they are entitled to as
passengers, many take advantage of the more lucrative BI coverage
that provides for pain and suffering awards. In extreme cases, a
passenger might sue to collect under the driver of the other
vehicles' BI coverage, the host driver's BI coverage, the host
driver's UM coverage, the guest passenger's UM coverage, and
any medical payments coverage on the vehicle. This outrageous
collection scheme is just another tool used by plaintiff attorneys to
get the most money for their client. This abuse of the system needs
to be corrected by restricting the situations in which a guest
passenger may bring suit against the host driver.
Attacking the problem from a different angle, legislation that
reduces the number of auto accidents merits consideration.
Accidents are the source of losses, and are a main driving force of
insurance rate increases. If the number of accidents is reduced, the
number of claims and the dollar amount of losses paid by insurers
should be reduced. Continuing education for Louisiana's drivers
84. Medical Costs are capped for all injured persons, regardless of fault. Id.
§ 1797 (a).
85. § 1797 (b).
86. Report of the Actuarial Subcommittee, supra note 18, app. at 13.
87. AICPU/IIA [American Institute for Chartered Property Casualty
Underwriters and the Insurance Institute of America], Insurance Research
Council, IRC Report Shows Falling Auto Accident Rates, Higher Injury Claim
Rates (2002), http://www.ircweb.org/news/20021 111 .htm.
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addresses the root of the problem, since smarter drivers are safer
drivers. 8
8
Any serious suggestion must certainly meet a few criteria.
First, it must not be discriminatory, particularly against older
drivers. A plan that re-tests licensees starting five years after
initial licensing, and then continues only every ten years for the
duration of the licensee's driving life, satisfies this non-
discrimination requirement. Second, it must not be excessively
burdensome, i.e., costs too much. Granted, requiring drivers to
take a class every ten years would be very costly to the public in
dollars as well as time spent studying for and taking these exams.
Administering tests in DMV offices would also be costly to the
State as well as to drivers. To keep expenditures to a minimum,
this proposal consists of a "take home" exam that would be mailed
out to drivers before their license renews at or near the relevant
times. The driver would complete the exam, and either mail it
back with their renewal or present it at the DMV, at which time it
can be graded electronically. Alternatively, tests, and even classes,
could be administered electronically over the internet, similar to
states such as California. Finally, any proposal must be effective
and justify its cost. Admittedly there are concerns over the
effectiveness of such a "take home" exam, but the idea is that the
motor vehicle safety laws will be in front of the driver since they
have to at least look up the answers, making them aware
periodically of the proper rules of driving. Knowledge about
minimum stopping distances, proper lane usage, and rights of way
should foster safer and more courteous driving.
Motor vehicle accidents in Louisiana caused 865 deaths in
2002 and 896 deaths in 2003.89 It is inconceivable that drivers are
allowed to operate machines that kill people on a regular basis
without being required to take any drivers education. Most who do
receive drivers education do so at age fifteen and then are only
required to pass an eye exam periodically in order to renew their
license. Many professions where errors can have negative
consequences require continuing education of its practitioners. 90
Drivers of such dangerous machines should be held to a similar
standard.
88. Though evidence is inconclusive as to the effectiveness of any drivers
education program, insurance companies recognize this possibility, with most
offering sizable discounts for formal education.
89. Insurance Fact Book 2005, supra note 1, at 106 (citing Nat'l Safety
Council, Motor Vehicle Traffic Deaths by State, 2002-2003).
90. Architects, lawyers, physicians, and even real estate agents must meet
continuing education requirements in Louisiana.
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Other measures aimed at combating the increasingly litigious
nature of society may also play a key role in reducing both the
frequency and the severity of auto insurance claims. Proposals
such as mandatory arbitration and caps on contingency fees have
the potential to both encourage more reasonable settlements once
suit is filed and decrease the incentive to file suit by reducing its
lucrative nature. Other desirable side effects of these proposals
include alleviating some of the judicial backlog and reducing the
amount of time it takes for victims to be compensated.
V. CONCLUSION
The Omnibus Premium Reduction Act of 1997 and its flagship
provision, No Pay, No Play, was a step in the right direction for
auto insurance rate relief. Consumers briefly felt the effects of the
mandated rate reduction, there appears to have been a slight drop
in the uninsured population, and insurers did deny recovery to
some uninsured motorists. Though it provided some temporary
rate relief, No Pay, No Play failed to do more than scratch the
surface of the auto insurance reform problem. Louisiana needs a
morphine-type solution instead of aspirin if auto insurance
consumers are ever going to get any lasting "pain" relief. Given
the state's current predicament, lawmakers have nothing to lose
and should be aggressive in pursuing insurance rate reform.
Reforms need to address the problems underlying insurance rates,
not just the rates themselves. Proposals that will have direct and
long-term effects on the state's frequency and severity of claims
offer the most promise for delivering the desired result, affordable
auto insurance coverage for Louisiana citizens.
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